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Abstract This theoretical paper is offered in the spirit of
advancing the debate on the socioemotional wealth (SEW)
construct and its impact on how family firms conceptualize
and practise corporate social responsibility (CSR). The
study builds on Kellermanns et al.’s (Entrep Theory Pract
36(6):1175–1182, 2012) claim that the SEW dimensions
can be positively and negatively valenced as well as makes
a distinction between the selective and instrumental
approach to CSR and the holistic and normative one.
Drawing on these considerations, it provides a theoretical
underpinning in favour of the view that SEW has
ambivalent nature and therefore can produce detrimental
outcomes for stakeholders of family companies. In this
way, the study challenges the implicit assumption prevalent
in the literature that SEW is ‘‘a prosocial and positive
stimulus’’. Crucially, it expands on the SEW construct by
arguing that, given its ambivalent nature, SEW, as such, is
at odds with the ‘‘strategic, whole-business view of
responsibility’’. Consequently, it posits that family firms—
because of their concern with SEW—may be more likely to
adopt the instrumental and selective rather than strategic
(holistic) and normative approach. Hence, it also makes the
case for regarding the latter as a reference point to inves-
tigate the family company’s attitude towards social
responsibility. It concludes by summarising the argument
and offering future research avenues.
Keywords Socioemotional wealth  Corporate social
responsibility  Family firms  Human resource
management  Environmental management
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Introduction
Much consideration has of late been given to the prob-
lematics of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which
has not only emerged as an influential managerial concept,
but has also entered the public discourse, influencing the
debate on the role of the company in today’s society (Baron
2001; Blowfield and Murray 2011; Chandler and Werther
2014; Economist 2014a; Lim and Tsutsui 2012; Porter and
Kramer 2006, 2011). Therefore, extensive multidisci-
plinary research has been undertaken—within the theoret-
ical framework that combines business ethics, strategic
management and behavioural economics—into the
motives, mechanisms and effects of the adoption of
socially responsible practices (see, inter alia, Aguilera
et al. 2007; Hillenbrand et al. 2013; Zientara et al. 2015).
Within the family business literature, the discussion has
been framed around the question of whether family firms
are more socially responsible than their non-family coun-
terparts (Adams et al. 1996; Bingham et al. 2011; Cennamo
et al. 2012; Dyer and Whetten 2006; Cruz et al. 2014;
Morck and Yeung 2003; Stavrou et al. 2007; O’Boyle et al.
2010). Without a doubt, family firms differ in some
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respects from non-family enterprises (Chrisman et al. 2012;
Chua et al. 2009; Sharma 2006). Above all, they are
characterized by the need to protect and preserve socioe-
motional wealth (SEW)—a multidimensional construct
that denotes family owners’ ‘‘affective endowments’’
(Berrone et al. 2012b). By and large, the particular SEW
dimensions—family control and influence, identification of
family members with the firm, binding social ties, emo-
tional attachment to the firm and renewal of family
bonds—are ‘‘portrayed as inspiration for family firms to
demonstrate care for their stakeholders. As such, SEW is
depicted as a prosocial and positive stimulus’’ (Keller-
manns et al. 2012, p. 1176). This is all the more so given
that ‘‘members of family firms are more likely to view the
business as an extension of themselves. As a result, they
are more likely to avoid situations that may bring negative
perceptions to their organizations’’ (O’Boyle et al. 2010,
p. 4). All this has led many scholars (Cennamo et al. 2012;
Cruz et al. 2014) to assume that family businesses may
well be more inclined to engage in CSR than non-family
firms (however, the findings by Morck and Yeung (2003)
do not bear this assumption out).
Of course, family firms themselves do not constitute a
homogenous group in terms of CSR adoption (De´niz-De´niz
and Cabrera-Sua´rez 2005). For example, a study by Mar-
ques et al. (2014) shows that Spanish family enterprises
follow different patterns of engagement in CSR, with
family values being a key differentiating factor. This strand
of research, rather than investigating whether family firms
are more or less socially responsible than non-family ones,
seeks to explore the mechanisms that underlie family firms’
attitudes towards CSR. In other words, what is at issue here
are the particular factors that determine the family firm’s
inclination to engage in CSR. And chief among them is
family involvement, which is instrumental in embedding
family values into the organisational culture. And research
shows that those firms that are characterized by greater
family involvement are also more likely to engage in CSR
(Bingham et al. 2011; Gedajlovic et al. 2012; Marques
et al. 2014; O’Boyle et al. 2010).
Nonetheless, if one assumes that SEW is the main frame
of reference for family firms, its protection and preserva-
tion must also be seen as playing a key role in how family
companies conceptualize and practise CSR. Given that
CSR is conceptually embedded in the stakeholder view
(Freeman 1984), it matters how SEW protection affects
treatment of different stakeholders. In this context, Berrone
et al. (2012a) argue that, in a bid to preserve SEW, family
owners carry out proactive stakeholder engagement (PSE)
initiatives underpinned by either instrumental or normative
motives. Likewise, Cruz et al. (2014), focusing explicitly
on CSR, assert that family owners, being primarily con-
cerned with SEW protection, vary in their responses to the
demands of different stakeholders. Pertinently, they found
that (Spanish) family enterprises tend to behave responsi-
bly towards external stakeholders and, at the same time,
irresponsibly towards internal stakeholders. This, in turn,
led them to postulate that family firms ‘‘can be socially
responsible and irresponsible at the same time’’ or, in other
words, can simultaneously be ‘‘good and bad’’ (Cruz et al.
2014, pp. 1295–1296).
Admittedly, such discriminatory behaviour can also be
observed in non-family firms, which sometimes treat dif-
ferently internal and external stakeholders, too. Still, it is
family firms that, at least in theory, are more likely to act in
this way due to SEW (in particular, due to the ‘‘family
control and influence’’ dimension of SEW). Indeed, as
Kellermanns et al. (2012) argue, SEW may have a ‘‘dark
side’’ and, accordingly, produce negative outcomes for
stakeholders of family firms. This is because, to follow
their reasoning, the particular dimensions of SEW can be
positively and negatively valenced, which, as such, is at
variance with the view prevalent in the literature (Berrone
et al. 2012a, b) that the SEW dimensions have positive
valence (see also Barrett 1996). It follows that SEW may
also a key factor behind the family’s self-serving conduct
(Kellermanns et al. 2012). These insights have serious
implications for the practice of CSR in family firms.
Indeed, being ‘‘simultaneously socially responsible and
irresponsible’’ bears upon the very essence of CSR, which
centres on a much-debated dichotomy between normative
and instrumental motivation for CSR adoption. Apart from
purely ethical concerns that also raises questions about the
costs of CSR adoption and its impact on corporate per-
formance (Lee 2008). In this context, much has been made
of ‘‘shared value’’—a sort of win–win outcome whereby
both the company and the environment benefit as reduced
resource consumption, thanks to the introduction of envi-
ronmental management practices, results in lower operat-
ing costs and hence smaller environmental impacts (see
also Porter and Kramer 2011). From a certain perspective,
however, such attitude towards CSR hallmarks instru-
mental motivation: after all, it is in any company’s interest
to produce efficiency gains by cutting resource consump-
tion (irrespective of the impact on the environment) and
subsequently to publicize its achievements in order to
burnish its green (and philanthropic) credentials for the
sake of image and reputation.
However, there is evidence that a growing number of
companies have come to regard CSR as an holistic business
philosophy (or a management ethos). Accordingly, for
those firms CSR becomes a core part of their strategy
(Bohdanowicz and Zientara 2008; Coles et al. 2013;
Camilleri 2014), which means that it underpins entire
business practice and serves to set ‘‘targets not only for the
company but for the people it works with and sells to’’
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(Economist, 2014a, p. 53). In the words of Coles et al.
(2013, p. 126), ‘‘the practice of CSR within organisations
[…] should not be selective. For instance, it should not
focus exclusively on a single issue domain such as the
environmental impacts of an organisation. […] It involves
a strategic, whole-business view of responsibility that is
expected to permeate all areas of operations, across the
entire value chain, and with due consideration of the dis-
tinctive needs of stakeholder groups’’ [my italics]. All this
implies a strategic approach of holistic character that is
underpinned by genuine commitment and normative
motivation. By definition, it involves behaving responsibly
towards all stakeholders and, consequently, rules out
cherry-picking those socially responsible initiatives that are
seen to serve narrowly defined company interests (the
epitome of self-serving behaviour). Unilever and Scandic
can be held up as paragons of this approach (Bohdanowicz
and Zientara 2008; Economist 2014a).
In the light of these considerations, it is possible to
assume that, because of concern with SEW and its ‘‘dou-
ble-valenced’’ nature, family owners might be more
inclined to adopt the selective and instrumental approach
rather than the strategic (holistic) and normative one. To
reiterate, for a firm that is authentically committed to CSR,
it would be inconceivable, say, to selectively implement
environmental management practices1 and, at the same
time, treat its employees unfairly since such conduct might
suggest inconsistency or a kind of ‘‘corporate schizophre-
nia’’. Put another way, they might be more likely to treat
CSR selectively and instrumentally, as a means of obtain-
ing—in the name of SEW—various self-interested ‘‘gains’’
rather than as a centrepiece of the strategy that reflects their
authentic and altruistic preoccupation with the wider social
good. All that implies that, instead of asking whether
family firms are more socially responsible than non-family
businesses, it is more appropriate to ask what an approach
to CSR they are likely to adopt in view of the ambivalent
nature of SEW. The present paper, which is theoretical in
character, aims to critically address these issues.
More specifically, this study makes a number of con-
tributions to the extant body of research on SEW and CSR.
First, building upon Kellermanns et al.’s (2012) claim that
the SEW dimensions can be positively and negatively
valenced, it provides a theoretical underpinning in favour
of the view that SEW, essentially, has ambiguous nature
and can thus produce detrimental outcomes for stakehold-
ers of family companies. Accordingly, the paper challenges
the implicit assumption prevalent in the literature that SEW
is ‘‘a prosocial and positive stimulus’’ (Berrone et al.
2012a, b). Rather, it argues that SEW—due to its ‘‘double-
valenced’’ nature—can be a negative stimulus, which leads
to business practice contradictions that might ultimately
threaten the very survival of the firm (thereby risking a
total loss of SEW). For example, the paper shows that
family owners who seek to burnish their environmental
credentials for the sake of the ‘‘image and reputation’’
dimension of SEW and who, at the same time, treat
unfairly their own employees due to the ‘‘family control
and influence’’ dimension act contradictorily and counter-
productively. This is because without voluntary involve-
ment of (low-ranking and non-family) employees, it is
virtually unfeasible to carry out any environmental man-
agement practices1 and because—thanks to public scrutiny
of corporate conduct in social media—the family firm’s
reputation can be tarnished not only by irresponsible
behaviour towards external stakeholders (i.e. the environ-
ment), but also by irresponsible conduct towards internal
stakeholders. At the same time, incompetent or unfair
treatment of employees negatively affects the firm’s com-
petitiveness, which not only diminishes the family’s
chances of acquiring tangible socioemotional benefits, but
may also result in the total SEW loss. Therefore, by acting
like this, the family might end up harming itself (which,
from a certain point of view, might be interpreted as
‘‘blindness’’ to the ‘‘dark side’’ of SEW).
Second and related, the paper expands on the SEW
construct by arguing that, given its ambivalent nature,
SEW, as such, is at odds with the ‘‘strategic, whole-busi-
ness view of responsibility’’. Consequently, it posits that
family firms—because of their concern with SEW—may
be more likely to adopt the instrumental and selective
rather than holistic and normative approach. Put another
way, they might be more likely to treat CSR selectively and
instrumentally, as a means of obtaining—in the name of
SEW—various self-interested ‘‘gains’’ rather than as a
centrepiece of the strategy that reflects their authentic and
altruistic preoccupation with the wider social good. It
follows that, rather than being a ‘‘prosocial stimulus’’,
SEW might well be a driver of self-serving behaviour,
which runs counter to the perception of CSR as a force for
the wider social good.
Third, by advocating the ‘‘whole-business view of
responsibility’’ held by genuinely committed firms, the
paper suggests that—given the ambivalent nature of
SEW—it is more appropriate to ask what an approach to
1 It should also be noted at this juncture that, in practice, two
dimensions of CSR—environment and employee (alongside commu-
nity and customer/product)—overlap with human resource manage-
ment and environmental management (EM). The former involves
practices and functions that seek to attract, develop and retain the
organisation’s human resources (Lado and Wilson 1994) while the
latter involves ‘‘the processes and practices introduced by an
organization for reducing, eliminating, and ideally, preventing
negative environmental impacts arising from its undertakings’’
(Cooper 1998, p. 112). Alternatively, four CSR dimensions are
described as workplace, marketplace, environmental and community
CSR.
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CSR family firms are likely to adopt rather than whether
they are more likely to practise CSR relative to non-family
businesses. In this way, the paper not only challenges the
predominant view that—due to preoccupation with SEW
and its apparently prosocial and positive nature—family
companies may be more inclined to engage in CSR
(O’Boyle et al. 2010; Cennamo et al. 2012), but also makes
the case for regarding the holistic and normative approach
as a reference point to explore family companies’ attitudes
towards social responsibility.
Thus, the paper is offered in the spirit of advancing the
debate on the SEW construct and its impact on how family
firms conceptualize and practise CSR. While building on
Kellermanns et al. (2012), it expands on their work by
applying their insights into the SEW nature to the prob-
lematics of CSR (they focus on proactive stakeholder
engagement rather than corporate social responsibility). To
the best of my knowledge, there is little research work that,
while assuming that the SEW dimensions can be negatively
valenced, analyse its implications for CSR practice in
family firms. Its structure is as follows. The next sections
explore the implications of the double-valenced nature of
SEW for the family firm’s stakeholders and reputation.
Then, the focus shifts to societal values and their role for
adoption of the whole-business view of responsibility. The
following part discusses SEW in the context of the overlap
between the employee dimension of CSR and (green)
human resource management. The final section summarises
the argument, highlights contributions to the literature and
suggests future research directions.
The Implications of the Sew Approach
for Stakeholders
Even though some scholars continue to be critical of cor-
porate social responsibility (Mayer 2013) and decry ter-
minological confusion stemming from the widespread use
of overlapping but not completely interchangeable terms
(such as ‘‘social responsibility’’, ‘‘corporate citizenship’’ or
‘‘corporate responsibility’’) (Blowfield and Murray 2011),
it is widely acknowledged that CSR now occupies an
increasingly prominent position in business practice and, at
the same time, has an important role to play in solving
societal problems (Cacioppe et al. 2008). This is premised
on the belief that a company’s responsibility lies with
stakeholders rather than shareholders (Freeman 1984),
implying that it has obligations vis-a`-vis society other than
the maximisation of shareholder wealth (Font et al. 2012).
In fact, CSR directly bears on the stakeholder view and, by
extension, on the notion of ‘‘stakeholder democracy’’
(Freeman 1984), according to which firms have not only
shareholders, but also different (internal and external)
stakeholders, who, as such, are the recipients of corporate
actions (Wood and Jones 1995). The implication is that
managers, while seeking to maximise shareholder wealth,
should not disregard the interests and concerns of their
companies’ stakeholders (Peterson 2004).
In theory, this holds true of both family firms and their
non-family counterparts. Yet in family firms things are
more complicated. First, the family is an internal stake-
holder on account of its intrinsic links with the firm, such
as ownership and control, but non-family employees (with
outside managers to the fore) also belong to this category
(Mitchell et al. 2011). Hence, a distinction is made between
family and non-family internal stakeholders (it follows
that, when it comes to family firms, the internal stakeholder
category is not a homogenous one). Second and even more
important, family enterprises are characterized by the need
to preserve SEW, which has profound implications both for
stakeholder treatment and CSR practice.
In principle, SEW connotes the emotional value
intertwined with the family firm that satisfies the fam-
ily’s affective needs, such as influence and affinity.
Therefore, family members are, as a rule, motivated by a
desire to protect and preserve SEW (Berrone et al.
2012a, b). For that reason, they are thought to be likely
to eschew any action that might imperil SEW, which, at
least theoretically, makes family firms more inclined to
engage in socially responsible actions. In this context,
Berrone et al. (2012a), while exploring the inclination of
family owners for proactive stakeholder engagement,
argue that, in a bid to preserve SEW, they are driven by
instrumental or normative motives—a view that suggests
different responses to the claims of different stakehold-
ers. Likewise, Cruz et al. (2014) point out that, when
considering engagement in CSR-inspired initiatives,
family owners are preoccupied with SEW protection,
but—given the multidimensional character of SEW—
they are likely to vary in their responses to the demands
of different stakeholders. All this implies ‘‘stakeholder
differentiation’’ on the part of family owners. In practice,
this often means discriminatory behaviour vis-a`-vis non-
family internal stakeholders.
Indeed, there is evidence that favouritism in general and
nepotism in particular are commonplace in many family
businesses, resulting in non-family employees being dis-
criminated against (Burkart et al. 2003; Jaskiewicz et al.
2013). For instance, non-family employees are often passed
over for promotion. If SEW is a reference point, this can be
explained away by the ‘‘family control and influence’’ and
‘‘emotional attachment’’ dimensions. By ascribing positive
valence to these dimensions, SEW family owners—con-
cerned with SEW preservation—tend to act in such a way
so as to exert (permanent) control over the firm’s opera-
tions (Berrone et al. 2012a, b). This is why they are
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reluctant to hire outside chief executives, to delegate power
to non-family managers, to give non-family employees a
greater say in how the firm is run and to appoint outsiders
to the board (in 2015 the founder of Otsuka Kagu, a
Japanese furniture producer, sought to ‘‘oust his daughter
from the top of the family’s firm’’ for ‘‘bringing in outside
directors to sit alongside family members on the firm’s
board; Economist, 2015d, p. 52). Likewise, the ‘‘emotional
attachment’’ dimension of SEW implies that many family
members perceive their firms as a place where their
desiderata of affinity and self-fulfilment coincide and
blend. In practice, this underpins differentiation between
‘‘us’’ (family members) and ‘‘they’’ (non-family members)
and, by extension, the aforesaid discriminatory conduct
vis-a`-vis the latter.
But such unfair and irresponsible treatment may pro-
duce negative firm-level and employee-level outcomes;
thereby suggesting negative valence for these SEW
dimensions (Kellermanns et al. 2012). Given that outside
managers may not be empowered and/or may not be
allowed to participate in organisational decision-making,
they are likely to feel that not only are they treated
unfairly, but also that their potential (expertise and
competence) is underutilised—a sentiment that is bound
to render them dissatisfied with their jobs and hence
uncommitted to their organisation (Kirkman and Shapiro
2001; Porter et al. 1974). Therefore, from the theoretical
perspective combining the resource-based view and HRM
thinking, family owners’ tendency to retain total control
might be seen as a serious weakness that risks affecting
their firm’s competitiveness and performance (Armstrong
2009; Barney 1991, Barney et al. 2001; Makadok 2001).
The Economist (2015a, p. 60), referring to a study by
John van Reenen and his colleagues, points out that their
‘‘research shows that where family owners plump for
outside chief executives, their firms do no worse than
similarly sized ones with more diverse shareholders. But
all too often they pick kin over professional managers—
and performance suffers’’. In this way, the family might
end up harming itself.
At this point, it is also useful to draw on stewardship
theory, which holds that managers are not always driven
by a desire to achieve individual objectives and,
accordingly, may well behave as responsible stewards of
the resources (assets) they control (Corbetta and Salvato
2004; Davis et al. 1997). This is due to a number of
socio-psychological and contextual factors that cause
managers to regard themselves as stewards whose ‘‘be-
havior is ordered such that pro-organizational collec-
tivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic,
self-serving behaviors’’ (Davis et al. 1997, p. 24). That,
in turn, helps align their interests with those of owners,
which makes them less likely to act, as agency theory
suggests, to the detriment of the latter2 (Barney and
Hesterly 2008; Chua et al. 2009). But—in view of the
‘‘double-valenced’’ nature of SEW and the resulting
discriminatory and irresponsible treatment of non-family
internal stakeholders—it seems inconsistent and contra-
dictory to expect non-family managers to eschew self-
serving behaviours and, consequently, to act as respon-
sible stewards (of the family firm’s assets).
Crucially, this asymmetric stakeholder treatment
(‘‘family vs non-family members’’) also bears on the
question of ‘‘who we are’’ as an organisation, thereby
invoking the organisational identity theory, which focuses
on what is idiosyncratic and lasting about the firm. Given
the centrality of the family (and their status of the ‘‘privi-
leged’’ internal stakeholder), some scholars argued in the
past that family firms could afford to disregard—or, at
least, to be less responsive to—the claims of external
stakeholders. Of late, however, this view has been called
into question since, given that the identity of the family is
inextricably intertwined with that of the firm, in the eyes of
external stakeholders both identities fuse into one. In this
context, Cruz et al. (2014, p. 1296) state that ‘‘because
family firms are concerned with their image and reputation
as a way to protect their SEW, they are likely to be more
responsive to external stakeholders’ demands […] than
non-family firms’’. At the same time, ‘‘their concern with
control and influence within the company and their strong
emotional attachment to it (another two key SEW dimen-
sions) are likely to deter social actions related to internal
stakeholders […]’’.
In practice, this means that, when it comes to CSR,
family firms are likely to behave differently towards
internal stakeholders and external stakeholders (see also
Mitchell et al. 2011). If follows that family owners,
because of their concern with SEW, not only treat differ-
ently family and non-family internal stakeholders, but also
discriminate between internal and external stakeholders
(since, to repeat, the firm is likely to implement chiefly
those socially responsible practices that meet the demands
of external stakeholders). As a result, it is, in principle,
non-family employees who suffer discriminatory beha-
viour, suggesting negative valence to these SEW dimen-
sions and the consequent (CSR-related) contradictions.
2 This directly concerns the characteristic feature (and strength) of
family businesses, namely, that ‘‘they solve the ‘agency problem’ that
Adam Smith put his finger on in ‘The Wealth of Nations’ when he
argued that hired managers would never have the same ‘anxious
vigilance’ in running companies as the owners’’ (Economist 2014b,
p. 12).
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Socioemotional Wealth and Company Reputation
Above all, it is reasonable to claim that the family image and
reputation can also be tarnished by irresponsible behaviour
vis-a`-vis internal stakeholders (see also Zellweger et al.
2011). In fact, in today’s reality, which is increasingly
influenced by what people do in social media, any irre-
sponsible behaviour—be it towards internal or external
stakeholders—can sully the firm’s reputation. Indeed, given
that nowadays negative (electronic) word-of-mouth public-
ity is a mouse click away, it is naı¨ve or irrational to assume
that behaving badly towards one’s employees can be con-
cealed, and thus somehow unnoticed by the public, even if it
is accompanied by socially responsible behaviour towards,
say, the environment. Therefore, it is perfectly possible to
imagine a situation wherein the family firm treats its non-
family employees unfairly (thus behaving irresponsibly
towards its internal stakeholders), at the same time carrying
out green practices or helping the needy in the local com-
munity (thus responding to the demands of external stake-
holders). Yet, if the former conduct is publicised through
social media and if subsequently internet-users spearhead an
online campaign against that firm, its image is bound to
suffer, nomatter howmuch it does for the environment or the
local community (an online campaign on Facebookmounted
against Polish employers who behave unfairly and dishon-
estly towards their workforces is a case in point (Gazeta
Wyborcza 2015).
Pertinently, McDonald’s provides an example of how
unfair and irresponsible treatment of employees can tarnish
the reputation of a firm even if, simultaneously, it acts
responsibly in other areas of CSR (i.e. the environment, the
customer or the community). As is well known,McDonald’s
has of late gone to great lengths to green its operations (to
reduce its environmental footprint) and to ameliorate the
wellbeing of its customers (by including healthy products in
its traditional menu), implying that the American company
might have come closer to adopting the holistic and nor-
mative approach to CSR. Yet, in the meantime, McDonald’s
was accused of flagrant mistreatment of its employees by
violating their ‘‘rights to campaign for better pay and
working conditions’’ and resorting to ‘‘threats, surveillance,
discrimination, reduced hours and even sacking of workers
who supported the protests’’ (Economist, 2015b, p. 49). This
provoked widespread indignation online and, crucially,
demonstrated that the company’s approach had, in fact, little
to do with the holistic, value-based view of responsibility (at
the same time, thwarting its attempts to shed its reputation for
unfair if not exploitive staff treatment).
Of course, McDonald’s is not a family firm, but the case
does show how any company that acts responsibly towards
external stakeholders and irresponsibly towards internal
ones is likely to end up—thanks to the power of social
media and electronic word of mouth—with its reputation
tarnished. It also provides a counterexample to the argu-
ment that the eponymous family owner, by acting irre-
sponsibly and thus imperilling SEW, has more to lose than
‘‘faceless investors’’ (in a public non-family company, such
as McDonald’s). In fact, it is safe to assume that nowadays
no company—be it a family or non-family one—can afford
to behave irresponsibly in any area of its operation as this is
bound to be immediately castigated by the online com-
munity, with all its negative reputational consequences.
Therefore, those who argue that family firms are par-
ticularly concerned with their external image and hence do
not want to be perceived as irresponsible corporate citizens
by external stakeholders (Cruz et al. 2014; Deephouse and
Jaskiewicz 2013) fail to realise that—in line with the above
reasoning—today the external image of the family firm is
shaped also by internal stakeholders (i.e. employees), who
tend to publicize and share their personal impressions and
judgements of their employer’s behaviour in social media
(interestingly, Zellweger et al. (2011) suggest that image-
conscious family businesses should focus their CSR efforts
on internal stakeholders). It follows that behaving irre-
sponsibly towards its employees can nowadays have an
equally damaging effect on the firm’s reputation as failure
to implement environmental management practices or to
help poor inhabitants of the local community.
In the light of these considerations, it is even problem-
atic to differentiate between the ‘‘external image’’ pro-
jected to ‘‘external stakeholders’’ (Cruz et al. 2014,
p. 1300) and, consistently, the ‘‘internal image’’ projected
to ‘‘internal stakeholders’’. Actually, in an era of the
internet and social media, it seems more appropriate to
speak of a single reputation, which is projected simulta-
neously to internal and external stakeholders. This means
that if the family firm really wants to avoid being stigma-
tised as an irresponsible corporate citizen with a view to
protecting SEW, it needs to endorse corporate social
practices related to internal and external stakeholders
alike. However, as we already know, family owners, pre-
occupied with their image and reputation as a way to
protect SEW, tend to respond to the needs of the latter, de
facto discriminating against the former. Such conduct has
two important implications.
First, it undermines the claim that SEW is a ‘‘prosocial
and positive stimulus’’. After all, since non-family
employees are members of society on a par with inhabitants
of local communities and the firm’s customers, they
deserve, in equal measure, being treated responsibly and
fairly. To take the argument to its logical conclusion, SEW
can only be seen as ‘‘pro-social’’ if non-family employees
are somehow excluded from society, which, obviously,
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makes little sense. This, again, suggests negative valence
and contradiction. Second and related, it is at variance with
the strategic, whole-business view of responsibility, which,
in essence, rules out behaving differently towards internal
and external stakeholders and cherry-picking those socially
responsible initiatives that are deemed particularly useful
(for the promotion of the firm’s interests). In line with what
has been argued in the introduction, it is fair to say that
such selective and discriminatory behaviour amounts to
‘‘corporate schizophrenia’’. And this is exactly what
emerges from the study by Cruz et al. (2014, p. 1295) who
found that family firms ‘‘can be socially responsible and
irresponsible at the same time’’.
Undoubtedly, such ‘‘corporate schizophrenia’’ is not
typical of the conduct of authentically committed compa-
nies, such as Scandic (Bohdanowicz and Zientara 2008),
whose Code of Conduct applies universally to its
employees (called team members), suppliers, the environ-
ment and local communities (Scandic 2014). This is also
true of Hilton Worldwide (Bohdanowicz et al. 2011)—a
hotel chain inseparably associated with the Hilton family
(albeit no longer a family company). It follows that a firm
that adopts socially responsible practices towards external
stakeholders and, at the same time, behaves irresponsibly
towards internal stakeholders cannot regard CSR as a core
value (see also Bohdanowicz and Zientara 2012; Garay and
Font 2012; Thornton and Byrd 2013; Zientara 2014). It
might be argued, therefore, that, given the imperative to
preserve SEW and its ambivalent nature, family firms are
likely to adopt the selective and instrumental approach.
Accordingly, they tend to view CSR as a mere (public
relations) tool—rather than as a core part of the strategy—
with which to serve the family’s (narrowly defined) inter-
ests (it follows that well-publicised engagement in delib-
erately cherry-picked CSR initiatives is perceived as a gain
in SEW).
Of course, this issue, which has been brought up earlier,
is central to the problematics of CSR and comes down to
the following question: is corporate social responsibility, in
essence, about doing good for its own sake (‘‘because this
is the right thing to do’’) or about being seen to do good
(‘‘because it pays to project the image of a responsible
corporate citizen and because it is unbecoming for a
company not to practise CSR’’). In other words, should one
regard CSR as a core value that normatively underpins all
corporate decision-making or as a marketing instrument
that serves narrowly defined corporate interests (Garay and
Font 2012; Holcomb et al. 2007; Kotonen 2009; Rodriguez
et al. 2006; Vaaland et al. 2008)? Indeed, it is telling that
some scholars who explore CSR in family firms employ
such phrases as ‘‘obtain reputational benefits’’ or ‘‘firms
benefit […] from the implementation of social practices’’
(Cruz et al. 2014, p. 1300), which unambiguously implies
the instrumental and selective approach and, by extension,
self-interest. This, in turn, sits awkwardly with their defi-
nition of corporate social responsibility, which—borrowed
from McWilliams and Siegel (2001)—states that CSR is
about ‘‘actions that appear to further the social good, be-
yond the interest of the firm’’ (p. 117) [my italics]. To be
consistent, Cruz et al. (2014) should have defined CSR as
‘‘actions that appear to further the social good, in the
interest of the firm’’ (the implication is that SEW acts as a
driver par excellence of self-serving behaviour).
This aspect directly bears upon the question of the
impact of CSR on corporate performance (Lee 2008). Even
though it is increasingly argued that holistic and genuine
commitment entails a shift towards the concept of triple
bottom line, it does not necessarily have to signify that ‘‘the
virtue is its own reward’’. In fact, one can imagine a situ-
ation in which a company that is authentically committed
to CSR raises wages (to reduce income inequality) and
ensures that its products are ethically sourced (to improve
the situation of the workers who are employed by its
subcontractors in low-cost countries), which in the short-
term translates into higher operating costs. Yet, in the
meantime, it earns a reputation for integrity and responsi-
bility, which, in turn, attracts socially conscious customers
and appeals to like-minded investors (Carvalho et al. 2010;
Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). It also helps that its corporate
policies change ‘‘customers’ behaviour in beneficial
ways—by, say, increasing demand for green products that
the firm makes’’ (Economist 2014a, p. 53). All this even-
tually translates, ceteris paribus, into higher profits, which
suggests that it is possible to reconcile the corporate good
with the social good (Wijesinghe 2014). Nonetheless, there
is a world of difference between a decision to behave
responsibly because company owners/managers believe
that such conduct is likely to result in ‘‘reputational gains’’
(the instrumental and selective approach) and a decision to
behave responsibly because one believes that only such
conduct is ‘‘fundamentally good’’ and ‘‘morally right’’,
irrespective of whether it translates into any gains or not
(the holistic and normative approach).
The Role of Societal Values for CSR Practice
This raises the question of why certain firms decide to
wholeheartedly embrace CSR. In fact, such a stance con-
currently reflects and emanates from values, which define
‘‘what people believe to be fundamentally right or wrong’’
(Gursoy et al. 2013, p. 41) and, by this token, underpin the
collective psyche. In this context, it has to be emphasised
that, over the last two decades, there has been a significant
shift in how developed societies perceive not only the role
of the firm in the capitalist system, but also capitalism itself
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(even if one allows for the existence of different versions of
capitalism across the world). The emergence of sponta-
neous, grass-roots protest movements, such as Occupy
Wall Street, Anonymous or Spanish Indignados—along-
side numerous non-governmental organisations seeking to
fight against all sorts of societal injustices and abuses—is a
reflection of that shift.
Since more and more people realise that devastating the
environment and exploiting workers (be it directly or
indirectly employed) is morally wrong and unacceptable,
they set much store on environmentalism and equity of
treatment in the workplace (Zientara 2014). This, in turn,
leads them to expect companies to behave responsibly vis-
a`-vis the environment and their workforces and—given
that most members of society are both customers and
employees—to ‘‘punish’’ those firms that act irresponsibly.
That can be done, apart from spreading negative (elec-
tronic) word of mouth, by boycotting their products or
ruling them out as potential employers—a choice that is
fraught with serious consequences for any company willing
to hire talented and motivated individuals (Albinger and
Freeman 2000; Cacioppe et al. 2008; Greening and Turban
2000). Cacioppe et al. (2008) argue in this context that
well-educated managers and professionals tend to take into
account ‘‘the ethical and social responsibility reputations of
companies when deciding whether to work for them, use
their services or buy shares in their companies’’ (p. 681).
And in an era of the global war for talent, no firm can
afford to forgo employment of socially conscious high
skilled persons. Equally importantly, there is strong evi-
dence that the firm’s engagement in CSR is positively
associated with employees’ attitudes, most notably with
their organisational commitment (Stites and Michael 2011,
Zientara et al. 2015). Thus, a company that acts irrespon-
sibly risks seeing some of its employees leave or engage
insufficiently in their work, which is likely to undermine its
competitiveness (of which more below).
But, certainly, employers (firm owners/managers) are
also members of society. The implication is that if they
espouse and internalise the same values—in other words, if
they believe, like others, that behaving irresponsibly
towards the environment and the workforce is morally
wrong—they are more likely to put these ideals into
practice in their companies. This has special significance
for family firms. Given that it is family involvement that
determines—through the values the family cherishes and
lives by—the family firm’s engagement in CSR (Marques
et al. 2014), it is reasonable to assume that if the family
owner strongly believes in environmental sustainability
and social fairness, he or she can easily turn these ideals
into a reality due to the control they exert over the firm.
That may also partially explain why family firms are more
likely to engage in CSR than their non-family counterparts.
However, as has been argued throughout the paper, the
question is not whether they are more likely (than non-
family companies) to implement CSR initiatives, but what
an approach to CSR they are likely to adopt. This is
because, to follow the above line of argument, their pre-
occupation with SEW can lead them to embrace the
instrumental and selective approach, which, as such, is
worlds apart from the holistic and normative approach.
Regardless of the family context, it is fair to say that,
values per se go a long way towards explaining why some
firms decide to hold a strategic, whole-business view of
responsibility. Arguably, it is Scandinavia that provides
compelling evidence in favour of this postulate. There is
little doubt that in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland and
Denmark people are not only emotionally attached to
environmentalism, social fairness and egalitarianism, but
also ‘‘practise what they preach’’. Indeed, Scandinavians
are renowned for their environmental attitudes and envi-
ronmental responsible behaviour (ERB) (see also Lee et al.
2015). Not coincidentally, in Scandinavia ‘‘veneer envi-
ronmentalism’’—or the gap between the professed envi-
ronmental values and the actual behaviours (Scott 2011;
Weaver 2011)—is less prevalent than elsewhere in the
world. Furthermore, as citizens and members of society,
they expect governments to enact and enforce relevant
legislation (Albrizio et al. 2014; Environmental Perfor-
mance Index 2015), as customers and employees, exhibit a
strong preference for firms that behave responsibly and, as
employers, ensure the realisation of these ideals in the
workplace. Norway, for example, has made greatest strides
towards gender equality, introducing female-friendly poli-
cies that encompass board quotas and public child care.
It is no coincidence, too, that a considerable number of
Scandinavian companies have decided to espouse a
strategic, whole-business view of responsibility (Bo-
hdanowicz and Zientara 2008; Kotonen 2009; Coles et at.
2013). This means, to repeat, that they see CSR as a core
part of their strategies and, accordingly, behave responsibly
not because they seek to ‘‘obtain reputational gains’’, but
because they believe that irresponsible behaviour—both
towards internal and external stakeholders—is ‘‘funda-
mentally wrong and morally unacceptable’’ (Scandic
2014).
Sew in the Context of the Overlap Between Hrm
and the Employee Dimension of CSR
The above quotation from Scandic’s Code of Conduct
suggests that family firms’ tendency to abate social prac-
tices directed at internal stakeholders (i.e. non-family
employees) not only goes against the holistic approach, but
also flies in the face of modern HRM thinking (Armstrong
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2009; Guest 1997; Lado and Wilson 1994). This is because
it is in the very interest of any organisation to treat its
employees well, regardless of whether it is committed to
CSR or not and whether it is a family firm or not (De Kok
et al. 2006). If, to follow this reasoning, the firm mis-
manages its employees—or if it fails to develop their
potential (via training), to treat them fairly (via pay and
promotion based on merit rather than connections or family
ties), to involve them in organisational decision-making
(via participation and empowerment) or to unfetter their
creativity (via autonomy and a supportive organisational
climate)—it is likely to see, ceteris paribus, its competi-
tiveness decrease. As Collins and Smith (2006) suggest,
HR systems ‘‘affect firm performance by creating an
organizational environment that elicits employee beha-
viours and capabilities that contribute to firm competitive
advantage’’ (p. 545). Accordingly, neglect of HRM—
which is likely to produce an uncommitted and untrained
workforce—seems to be self-defeating.
What it comes down to, therefore, is that incompetent
HRM—especially, paying scant regard to high-perfor-
mance work systems (HPWS), which ‘‘refer to a group of
separate but interconnected HRM practices […], which are
designed to enhance employee and firm performance out-
comes through improving workforce competence, attitudes,
and motivation’’ (Takeuchi et al. 2009, p. 1)—can affect
the firm’s ability to compete and ultimately to survive.3
And, as is widely acknowledged, family firm failure is
associated with the total SEW loss; in extremis, the family
loses everything if its firm goes under. That, in turn,
prompts the (pragmatic) question of whether it makes sense
to treat employees irresponsibly, unfairly and inexpertly—
in a bid to protect SEW (Berrone et al. 2012a, b; Go´mez-
Mejı´a et al. 2014)—if such an attitude can, in the longer
run, jeopardise the very existence of the firm, thereby
risking a loss of SEW? This again implies negative valence
and contradiction.
Moreover, a desire to exert direct and permanent control
over the entire organisation (in the name of ‘‘family control
and influence’’) also appears to be at variance with modern-
day HRM thought, which highlights the significance and
advocates the practice of empowerment, autonomy and
participation (Green 2008;Heller et al. 1998; Zientara 2014).
These conceptually related notions, while positively influ-
encing staff behaviour, are about expanding (rather than
restricting) employees’ freedom in the workplace by grant-
ing them discretion over how they perform their tasks and a
greater say in organisational decision-making. In other
words, they are the antithesis of family owners’ tendency to
centralize decision-making and wield (‘‘top-down’’) control
over every aspect of company operation. As highlighted
earlier in the text, this manifests itself, too, in family owners’
reluctance to hire outside executives and to delegate more
power to non-family managers.
All this has two far-reaching implications. First, given the
existence of the overlap between HRM and the employee
dimension of CSR (Zientara 2014), it seems irrational and
self-defeating to ignore HRM issues—also by ‘‘abating
social practices related to internal stakeholders’’ (i.e. also as
part of the firm’s CSR policy)—as such conduct is likely to
produce undesirable employee-level outcomes. Several
psychological theories—most notably, social exchange
theory (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), organismic inte-
gration theory (Ryan and Deci 2000) and social information
processing theory (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978)—go some
way towards explaining this phenomenon. For example,
social information processing theory, which holds that the
social environment wherein individuals operate influences
their attitudes, and organismic integration theory, which
unpicks the mechanism of individual motivation through
external stimuli, imply that unfair treatment and neglectmust
lead to an unmotivated and uncommitted workforce. It fol-
lows that if the family firm practices nepotism and discrim-
inates against non-family employees (Burkart et al. 2003;
Jaskiewicz et al. 2013) or if it fails to train its workforce (thus
neglecting worker development), it cannot reasonably
expect its employees to be satisfied, committed and engaged.
And, as is well known, job satisfaction, organisational
commitment and work engagement are key attitudes, which
not only determine employee behaviour in the workplace,
but are also positively associated with a wide array of firm-
level outcomes (Bakker et al. 2011; Cegarra-Leiva et al.
2012; Kirkman and Shapiro 2001; Meyer and Allen 1991;
Mowday et al. 1982).
Second and related, competent and responsible man-
agement of human resources can effectively ameliorate the
family owners’ position and reputation—and hence
SEW—as a result of its better performance relative to its
direct competitors as well as positive (electronic) word-of-
mouth publicity. In line with what has been argued earlier,
satisfied and loyal employees are likely to project the
positive image of the firm in social media, which, in turn,
may attract potential job applicants and customers with a
strong preference for socially responsible firms. It follows
that economic success due to competent HRM can produce
tangible socioemotional benefits for the family, which
reiterates the importance of HRM for its firm’s competi-
tiveness and performance (arguably, the same can be said,
toutes proportions garde´es, about investment by family
firms in R&D; see also Go´mez-Mejı´a et al. 2014).
But there is far more to this than that. One aspect of the
overlap between corporate social responsibility and HRM
3 The general consensus is that, pace calls for caution, the quality of
the firm’s HRM policy is positively related to its performance
(Fleetwood and Hesketh 2006; Wall and Wood 2005).
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has to do with the channels through which CSR impacts the
way employees are managed. Employee involvement in
CSR-inspired environmental initiatives is a case in point
(Bohdanowicz and Zientara 2008; Bohdanowicz et al.
2011). In fact, when employees participate in ‘‘green’’
training—and extensive training is part of HPWS—or
engage in hands-on eco-friendly activities (say, planting
trees or recycling waste), they learn new things. In this
way, employee human capital is developed (it should be
noted that both training and worker development feature
saliently in CSRHub’s employee category, which is often
used for assessing firms’ commitment to CSR). It is,
therefore, clear that employee development occupies a
prominent position both in HRM and CSR.
Moreover, given that the environmental dimension of
CSR entails, as a rule, implementation of environmental
management practices, it is now acknowledged that effective
EM requires interaction with human resource management
(Paille´ et al. 2014; Wehrmeyer 1996). In other words, HRM
is increasingly seen to play an important part in improving
the firm’s environmental performance (Bohdanowicz et al.
2011; Daily et al. 2012; Jackson and Seo 2010; Jackson et al.
2012; Paille´ et al. 2014;Wehrmeyer 1996). This, in turn, has
given rise to the term ‘‘green human resource management’’
(Jackson et al. 2011; Renwick et al. 2013), which implies,
among other things, that organisations should employ HR
practices to engage employees in pro-environmental beha-
viours. And there is widespread agreement that these beha-
viours need to be discrete (which suggests that employees are
not forced—by immediate supervisors and/or concrete
stipulations in their contracts—to act). That conceptually has
to do with organisational citizenship behaviours (OCB) in
general and organisational citizenship behaviours for the
environment (OCBE) in particular (Paille´ et al. 2014). The
latter are defined as ‘‘discretionary acts by employees within
the organisation not rewarded or required that are directed
toward environmental improvement’’ (Daily et al. 2009,
p. 246). The same logic extends to CSR. As the above
example shows, it is indeed (low-ranking) employees who
engage in OCB and de facto implement most CSR projects:
they not only plant trees or recycle waste, but also participate
in assorted activities aimed at helping local communities (for
example, they volunteer in local old people’s homes).
Accordingly, the success of the firm’s CSR-inspired
environmental efforts depends, to a large extent, on its
capacity to voluntarily involve its employees who,
accordingly, need encouragement and support.4 What is
required, therefore, is an organisational climate that is
supportive of active environmental engagement (in prac-
tice, such a climate is underpinned by perceived organi-
sational support and perceived supervisor support; Paille´
et al. 2014). This is vital since, by and large, ‘‘when
employees perceive that their organisation provides a
supportive, involving, and challenging climate […], they
are more likely to respond by investing time and energy
and by being psychologically involved in the work of their
organization’’ (Bakker et al. 2011, p. 13). The implication
is that ‘‘a company can devastate its efforts to become
environmentally responsible if there is little or no support
to train and encourage its employees to ‘do the right
thing’’’ (Govindarajulu and Daily 2004, p. 336).
In this context, the question arises of how to reconcile
these insights with the tendency of the family firms, as
documented by Cruz et al. (2014), to behave irresponsibly
towards their workforces. Arguably, this is hardly conducive
to the creation of a climate that is supportive of any organi-
sational citizenship behaviours. It follows that it is prob-
lematic and inconsistent to expect employeeswho are treated
irresponsibly to voluntarily engage in socially responsible
actions and environmental management initiatives (oriented
towards external stakeholders) (Neubaum et al. 2012). All
that, again, suggests contradictions and negative valence to
the SEW dimensions. At the same time, these contradictions
also imply failure to recognise that HRM cannot be divorced
both from CSR-inspired environmentalism (Wehrmeyer,
1996) and ethics (Greenwood, 2013).
Conclusive Remarks
This paper, drawing on Kellermanns et al.’s (2012) claim
that the SEW dimensions can be negatively and positively
valenced, has sought to provide a theoretical underpinning
in favour of the view that SEW, in essence, has ambiguous
and contradictory nature, leading to harmful outcomes for
stakeholders of family firms. In this way, it has aimed to
challenge the assumption predominant in the literature that
SEW is ‘‘a prosocial and positive stimulus’’. In particular,
the paper has argued that, given its ambivalent, ‘‘double-
valenced’’ nature, SEW is at odds with the ‘‘strategic,
whole-business view of responsibility’’, which means that
family firms—because of their concern with SEW—may
be more likely to adopt the instrumental and selective
rather than holistic and normative approach to CSR. In
other words, family firms may be more likely to treat CSR
instrumentally, with a view to obtaining—in the name of
SEW—various self-interested ‘‘gains’’ rather than as a
centrepiece of the strategy that reflects their concern with
the wider social good. Seen in this way, CSR acts as a
(public relations) tool with which to promote the family
firm’s interests while SEW becomes a driver of self-serving
4 Also worth mentioning is the sustainable development-stakeholder
relations management approach (Pe´rez and Rodrı´guez del Bosqu,
2014), which emphasises the role managing stakeholders (with




behaviour. Accordingly, the paper, by advocating the
holistic and normative view of responsibility, has also
postulated that it should serve as a reference point to
explore any firm’s stance on CSR.
More specifically, the paper, while explaining why the
SEW dimensions can be negatively valenced, has identified
a number of inherent contradictions related to the SEW
view. These can be summarised as follows:
(1) While it might well be true that any enterprise—be it
family or non-family one—can carry out socially
responsible practices related to external stakeholders
and, simultaneously, act irresponsibly towards inter-
nal stakeholders, it is family firms that are more likely
to do so due to concern with SEW and its ambiguous
nature. Therefore, SEW, underpinning discriminatory
behaviour towards non-family employees (non-fam-
ily internal stakeholders) cannot be seen as an
unequivocally prosocial and positive incentive since
the family firm’s staff are alsomembers of society and,
as such, merit fair treatment (on a par with its external
stakeholders, such as customers and inhabitants of
local communities). Equally importantly, family
firms’ tendency to cherry-pick only those CSR
initiatives that are deemed to serve their own interests
is at odds with the claim that CSR is about ‘‘actions
that appear to further the social good, beyond the
interest of the firm’’. Accordingly, SEW, being a de
facto driver of self-serving behaviour, somehow
degrades the character of CSR as a true force for
societal advancement.
(2) Because of the need to protect SEW, family firms are
particularly concerned with its image and reputation
(as they see the business as an extension of the
family name), which makes them likely to be more
responsive to the demands of external rather than
internal stakeholders. This fixation on image is not
only likely to lead family firms to adopt the
instrumental and selective approach to CSR, but
also rests on the mistaken assumption that a com-
pany’s external image hinges on how it treats its
external stakeholders. Indeed, nowadays any firm’s
image and reputation can also be tarnished by
irresponsible behaviour vis-a`-vis its internal stake-
holders (who, to reiterate, tend to expose and
criticise online their employers’ irresponsible or
incompetent conduct). In fact, thanks to social
media, behaving irresponsibly towards either exter-
nal or internal stakeholders usually tarnishes the
company’s reputation. And there are examples of
unfair or unprofessional employee treatment which
has damaged, or at least sullied, the ‘‘external
image’’ of a firm even if it behaves responsibly in
other areas of CSR. In this sense, given that now
corporate behaviour in its entirety is under intense
public scrutiny, it is hardly warranted to differentiate
between the ‘‘external’’ and ‘‘internal’’ image.
Rather, there is a single company image which is
bound to suffer as a result of irresponsible conduct;
(3) In view of the link between the quality of the firm’s
HRM and its competitiveness as well as the overlap
between HRM and the employee dimension of CSR,
family firms’ tendency to behave irresponsibly vis-a`-
vis their (non-family) employees—in the name of
SEW and as a result of the adoption of the selective
and instrumental approach to CSR—is fraught with
contradictions. Worker development in general and
training provision in particular feature prominently
both in theHRMandCSRnarratives: they form part of
high-performance work systems and, simultaneously,
constitute socially responsible actions, as confirmed
by the contents of CSRHub’s employee category.
Does irresponsible conduct towards their employees
(internal stakeholders) suggest, therefore, that family
firms pursue self-defeating policy? After all, unpro-
fessional HRM practice or unfair behaviour towards
employees threaten—by decreasing competitiveness
and affecting performance in the longer run—the very
survival of the firm (hence a total loss of SEW).
Conversely, responsible and competent treatment of
human resources is likely, all else being equal, to
improve the family owners’ position and reputation
(through enhanced competiveness and positive word
of mouth), which, in turn, brings socioemotional
benefits to the family, thereby buttressing SEW.
(4) Considering that any firm’s human resources are its
greatest assets and a source of competitive advantage,
family owners’ reluctance to hire outside directors, to
empower non-family managers and to give all (non-
family) employees a greater say in organisational
decision-making—in the name of the ‘‘family control
and influence dimension’’ of SEW—can have dire
firm-level consequences. The unwillingness to draw
on outsiders’ potential matters in particular in an era of
globalwar for talent whereby companies viewith each
other for most talented individuals. Therefore, a
decision to forgo high skilled individuals who
increasingly pay attention to how their future
employer treats the stakeholders may—again—affect
the family firm’s chances of survival. This, in turn,
might end up ultimately harming the family.
(5) Given that family firms’ focus on their ‘‘image and
reputation’’ in the outside world (as a way to protect
SEW), they are loath to be stigmatised as irrespon-
sible corporate citizens. Hence, to project the image
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of environmental responsibility, in the first place
family firms need to practice environmental man-
agement. Yet this is unfeasible without active and
voluntary involvement of low-ranking (non-family)
employees (Bohdanowicz et al. 2011; Jackson et al.
2011; Paille´ et al. 2014; Renwick et al. 2013;
Wehrmeyer 1996). But how can one expect employ-
ees who are treated irresponsibly and unprofession-
ally to engage in organisational citizenship
behaviours and, accordingly, to carry out socially
and environmentally responsible initiatives? In other
words, it is inconsistent and unworkable to seek to be
seen—in the name of the ‘‘image and reputation’’
dimension of SEW—as an exemplary green corpo-
rate citizen and, at the same time, to behave
irresponsibly towards one’s employees (whose
involvement is key to the success of any environ-
mental programme).
All these contradictions and inconsistencies undermine
the claim that SEW has positive nature. They imply, too,
certain blindness to its ‘‘dark side’’ (Kellermanns et al. 2012)
on the part of family members. Very often family owners
perceive actions undertaken with the particular SEW
dimensions in mind as a gain in SEW, somehow not seeing
that they might eventually lead to a total loss of SEW
(thereby being detrimental to the family itself). Furthermore,
SEW, eliciting both ‘‘socially responsible and irresponsible
behavior’’ in family firms (Cruz et al. 2014, p. 1310), is at
variance with—and, from a certain perspective, irreconcil-
able with—the holistic and normative approach to CSR,
which, in principle, rules out such ‘‘schizophrenic’’ conduct.
When CSR becomes a core value and a central part of the
strategy, being ‘‘socially responsible and irresponsible’’ at
the same time is simply inconceivable. The experience of
Scandic, which, however, not a family firm, bears that
assertion out (Bohdanowicz and Zientara 2008). Indeed, it
shows what it means, in practice, to adopt the holistic and
normative approach to CSR.
Therefore, this study also offers wider implications for
research on CSR in both family and non-family companies.
Above all, while assessing any firm’s engagement in CSR,
it is advisable to look ‘‘under the skin’’ of the organisation
and to appropriately interpret certain facts. Some scholars
tend to regard participation in certification schemes, with
eco-labels to the fore, as an indicator of environmental
responsibly.5 In principle, this seems uncontroversial, yet it
is perfectly possible for a firm ‘‘to have a CSR strategy—or
not to have a formal policy but to act in a highly responsible
manner—and yet not to (want to) participate in certification
schemes: in other words, willingness to participate in
accreditation is not a criterion of, or a pre-requisite for, a
business to behave (more) responsibly’’ (Coles et al. 2013,
p. 127). This is because ‘‘like eco-labels, certification is an
institutional device, practically as amembership scheme that
recognises certain sets of activities for those who are eligible
and apply’’ (ibid., p. 127). Furthermore, CSR reports often
indicate, say, how many employees (as a percentage of the
total workforce) volunteer to work for the needy in the local
community, but they fail to specify whether staff are given
paid time off for the volunteering or not (which is indicative
of how committed to CSR the firm is).
Crucially, many companies explicitly declare that CSR
is a core value and hence constitutes a centrepiece of their
strategies. Such grandiose statements often feature saliently
in official documents and on corporate websites, giving the
impression that the businesses in question embrace the
whole-business philosophy (which is appreciated by a
growing number of socially conscious individuals who are
increasingly allergic to public relations narratives in gen-
eral and greenwash in particular). Yet, under closer scru-
tiny, it may turn out that the way those companies practise
CSR hallmarks the instrumental and selective approach.
This is because, as the example of Scandic shows (Bo-
hdanowicz and Zientara 2008), turning CSR into a core
part of the strategy is a veritable challenge that entails re-
prioritisation of corporate policies, instigation of a new
organisational climate and implementation of (revolution-
ary) changes to the way a firm operates, especially in the
area of human resource management and supply chain
management (for example, ‘‘to avoid contributing to
deforestation, Unilever already buys all its palm oil […]
through an audited sustainability scheme, and by 2020 it
plans to buy it from certified and traceable sources’’;
Economist 2015c, p. 54).
Thus, what is needed is verification of those grandiose
claims. In particular, when it comes to family businesses,
that can be done by conducting in-depth interviews with
family owners as well as, crucially, with low-ranking
employees. The former should be asked about how they
conceptualize CSR and whether, in reference to the ‘‘dark
side’’ of SEW, they see links between broadly understood
employee treatment and several firm-level variables,
including performance, competitiveness and reputation.
The latter, by contrast, should be asked about whether they
function in a social milieu that is supportive of OCB(E) and
whether they feel supported in their CSR-inspired (envi-
ronmental) activities by their supervisors and the organi-
sation. Such interviews should allow researchers to find out
whether, in fact, the companies under consideration hold
5 It is worth noting that ‘‘Certification is awarded to businesses or
activities that comply with a set of standards and generally requires
more than what legal regulations do. […] Labelling, which occurs
through giving an ecolabel, is an award that is given to a business or
activity that has significantly better performance compared to the
other businesses in its sector’’ (Graci and Dodds 2015, p. 200).
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the strategic, whole-business view of responsibility or
rather the instrumental and selective approach. And this, as
has been argued throughout the text, is of key importance
as the former appears to be a real force for the wider social
good. It is hoped that this paper will prompt both debate
and research on SEW and its impact on the practice of
CSR.
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